


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File
(Response dated 19 Dec)

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NSC



November 13, 1969


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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Soviet Analysis of U.S. Capabilities and Intentions

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The  report on intelligence analysis in the Soviet Union is a highly interesting study of the procedures and institutions by which the Soviets make judgments about the outside world. I would be interested to know what we know of the substance of those judgments.

For example:

-- What do they think is our targeting doctrine? Do they think our Minutemen are targeted on their cities or on their forces?


-- How do their perceptions of our forces and doctrines enter into their own strategic force decisions? Would they see a need to have a MIRV to respond to our ICBM force?

-- What is their current view on the kinds of situations in which we might use nuclear weapons? Do they expect quick use of theater weapons in a war in Europe? Do they see "bargaining" strikes or threats of strikes as a likely device in a confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR?

I realize that our information on questions like this may not be as complete and definitive as our information on some technical questions. On the other hand, the President has often expressed his interest in careful assessments of Soviet reactions to the courses of action he wants to consider. Analytic intelligence on how they view specific substantive areas helps us understand how they might react to future situations.

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I would appreciate receiving from you as soon as possible:

1. A paper outlining what we know now about the questions listed above.

2. A report on our present capability to analyze Soviet decision-making, with suggestions for improvements.


Henry A. Kissinger

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